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GAG CLAUSES AND THE RIGHT TO GRIPE: THE CONSUMER 
REVIEW FAIRNESS ACT OF 2016 & STATE EFFORTS TO 
PROTECT ONLINE REVIEWS FROM CONTRACTUAL 
CENSORSHIP 
 
Clay Calvert* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines new legislation, including the federal Consumer 
Review Fairness Act, signed into law in December 2016, targeting non-
disparagement clauses in consumer contracts.  Such “gag clauses” typically 
prohibit or punish the posting of negative reviews of businesses on 
websites, such as Yelp and TripAdvisor.  This article asserts that state and 
federal statutes provide the best means, from a pro-free-expression 
perspective, of attacking such clauses, given the disturbingly real possibility 
that the First Amendment has no bearing on contractual obligations 
between private parties. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 2016 presidential election season, Democrats and 
Republicans alike complained about nearly everything—the opposing 
nominee,1 their own nominee,2 fake news,3 presidential debates,4 media 
																																																						
* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the 
Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.  
B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge 
School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University.  
Member, State Bar of California.  The author thanks graduate students Minch Minchin, 
Austin Vining and Sebastian Zarate, as well as undergraduates Jessie Goodman, Lynne 
Higby, Sophia Karnegis, Haley Schaekel, Jayde Shulman, Van Miller and Olivia Vega of the 
University of Florida for their review of early drafts of this article. 
1 See, e.g., Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton to Portray Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy 
Positions as Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-foreign-
policy.html (quoting Jake Sullivan, Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton’s top policy 
adviser, for the proposition that Republican nominee “Donald Trump is unlike any 
presidential candidate we’ve seen, maybe ever, certainly in decades, in that he does not cross 
the threshold of fitness for the job”); Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Returns Fire, 
Calling Hillary Clinton a ‘World-Class Liar,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/politics/trump-speech-clinton.html (reporting that 
Republican nominee Donald Trump called Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton a “world-
class liar” and claimed she “may be the most corrupt person ever to seek the presidency”); 
Michael Wolff, Wolff: Derailing the Trump Train, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2016, 7:02 PM) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/wolff/2016/08/07/wolff-derailing-trump-
train/88289836/ (“The case, made by Republicans, Democrats and, more and more without 
restraint, the news media, gets stronger every day: Donald Trump is dangerous, unfit and 
crazy.  And the conclusion becomes ever-more emphatic: He must not be president.”).  
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bias,5 and the vacancy on the Supreme Court of the United States.6  It is 
fitting, then, that one of the only measures members of Congress from both 
																																																																																																																													
2 See, e.g., Amy Chozick et al., Hillary Clinton Struggles to Find Footing in Unusual 
Race, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/us/politics/hillary-
clinton-donald-trump.html (“In the corridors of Congress, on airplane shuttles between New 
York and Washington, at donor gatherings and on conference calls, anxiety is spreading 
through the Democratic Party that Mrs. Clinton is struggling to find her footing.”); Scott 
Clement, Will Immigration, Guns and Abortion be Wedge Issues in 2016?, WASH. POST, 
(July 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/20/will-
immigration-guns-and-abortion-be-wedge-issues-in-2016/ (“Roughly three-quarters of 
persuadable Republicans dislike Trump and a similar share of persuadable Democrats dislike 
Clinton.”); Adam Nagourney, Convention Offers Donald Trump His Biggest Sales 
Opportunity, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/us/politics/convention-offers-donald-trump-his-
biggest-sales-opportunity.html (reporting that during the Republican Convention in 
Cleveland, Donald Trump faced “the challenge of reassuring Republicans unhappy with 
their candidate, symbolized by the absence of so many party leaders, while using the event 
to expand his appeal to a broader electorate”); Frank Newport & Andrew Dugan, Clinton 
Still Has More Negatives Among Dems than Sanders, GALLUP (June 6, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/192362/clinton-negatives-among-dems-
sanders.aspx (reporting the results of a poll conducted in late May and early June of 2016 
among voters who identified as Democrats that revealed that Bernie Sanders, who shortly 
thereafter failed to win the Democratic party nomination, “continues to be significantly more 
popular than Hillary Clinton.  Sanders’ current net favorable rating among Democrats (+52) 
outpaces Clinton’s (+39) by 13 points.”); Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats’ Weak Bench 
Undermines Hope of Taking Back Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/us/politics/democrats-weak-bench-undermines-hope-
of-taking-back-senate.html(noting that Republicans “find themselves in a fundamental 
conflict between Mr. Trump’s populist insurgents and traditional conservatives”). 
3 In December 2016, erstwhile Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton railed against what 
she called an “epidemic of malicious fake news” and “voiced support for some federal 
legislation to address the ‘fake news’ issue.”  Paul Kane, Hillary Clinton Attacks ‘Fake 
News’ in Post-election Appearance on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, (Dec. 8. 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/12/08/hillary-clinton-attacks-
fake-news-in-post-election-appearance-on-capitol-hill/.  
4 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Patrick Healy, Actually, a Malfunction Did Affect 
Donald Trump’s Voice at the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/politics/donald-trump-debate.html (reporting that 
the Commission on Presidential Debates determined that the first debate “was marred by an 
unspecified technical malfunction that affected the volume of Donald J. Trump’s voice in the 
debate hall,” and noting that Trump “complained that the changing volume had distracted 
him and alleged again that someone had created the problem deliberately”); Philip Rucker et 
al., As Clinton Builds on a Strong Debate, Trump Lobs Attacks and Complaints, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as-clinton-builds-on-a-
strong-debate-trump-lobs-attacks-and-complaints/2016/09/27/6bb4cd2e-84cc-11e6-92c2-
14b64f3d453f_story.html?utm_term=.fa2b56f633ea (reporting that, after a presidential 
debate in September 2016 at Hofstra University, Republican nominee Donald Trump 
claimed “debate moderator Lester Holt, the anchor of ‘NBC Nightly News,’ was biased, and 
the Republican complained about the quality of his microphone”).  
5 See, e.g., Noah Bierman, Donald Trump Helps Bring Far-right Media’s Edgier 
Elements into the Mainstream, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-media-20160820-snap-story.html (“A 
Morning Consult poll released Friday found a plurality of Americans of all political stripes – 
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sides of the aisle agreed on that year was a bill7 safeguarding—you guessed 
it— the right to complain.  Introduced in the House of Representatives in 
April 2016 by Republican Leonard Lance of New Jersey and Democrat 
Joseph Kennedy III of Massachusetts,8 the Consumer Review Fairness Act 
of 2016 passed the House in September 2016.9  The Senate then 
unanimously approved it without amendment two months later.10  President 
Barack Obama, in turn, signed the bill into law on December 14, 2016.11 
Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), the law generally voids non-
disparagement clauses—colloquially called gag clauses12 or, less ominously 
and forebodingly, customer waivers13—in form contracts14 that either 
																																																																																																																													
38% – believed the media were biased in trying to help elect Hillary Clinton president, a far 
greater percentage than the 12% who said the media were biased in favor of Trump.”) 
(emphasis added); Alexander Burns & Nick Corasaniti, Donald Trump’s Other Campaign 
Foe: the ‘Lowest Form of Life’ News Media, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/us/politics/donald-trump-obama-isis.html (“Long a 
vehement critic of the political news media, Mr. Trump has increasingly organized his 
general-election effort around antagonizing the press.  He dedicates long sections of his 
speeches and innumerable tweets to savaging individual outlets, and claiming that media 
bias could effectively ‘rig’ the election for Hillary Clinton.”) (emphasis added). 
6 See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, As Donald Trump Falters, Democrats Plan to Press Fight 
for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/us/politics/donald-trump-democrats-supreme-
court.html (“The Senate has been stuck in a stalemate since the death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia in February left a vacancy on the bench.  Republicans have refused to hold 
confirmation hearings on President Obama’s nominee, insisting that the next president 
should make the choice.”); The Editorial Board, The Senate’s Confirmation Shutdown, N.Y. 
TIMES, (June 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/opinion/the-senates-
confirmation-shutdown.html (complaining that the failure by U.S. Senate Republicans to 
provide confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland was “shameful” 
and that it left the nation’s high court “hamstrung, unable to deliver conclusive rulings on 
some of the most pressing legal issues facing the country”). 
7 H.R. 5111, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted). 
8 Paul Muschick, Businesses Can’t Block Customer Reviews from Leaving Online 
Reviews, MORNING CALL (Dec. 28, 2016, 6:07 PM), 
http://www.mcall.com/news/local/watchdog/blog/mc-consumer-reviews-cant-be-banned-
watchdog-20161221-column.html. 
9 Stephanie Mlot, Congress Passes Bill Protecting Consumer Reviews, PC MAGAZINE, 
(Nov. 30, 2016, 7:03 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/news/349960/congress-passes-bill-
protecting-consumer-reviews. 
10 Id.  
11 Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1359 (2016); 
Andrew Tarantola, President Obama signs the Consumer Review Fairness Act into law, 
ENGADGET (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/12/15/president-obama-signs-
the-consumer-review-fairness-act-into-law/.   
12 See Christopher Elliott, A Pending Bill Would Prohibit Retribution for Negative 
TripAdvisor and Yelp Reviews, WASH. POST, (Sept. 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/a-pending- bill-would- prohibit-retribution-
for-negative-tripadvisor-and-yelp-reviews/2016/09/22/9cf39396-7e9d-11e6-8d0c-
fb6c00c90481_story.html. 
13 Chris Moran & Ashlee Kieler, Speak Freely America: New Federal Law Outlaws Gag 
Clauses That Punish You for Negative Reviews, CONSUMERIST, (Dec. 14, 2016, 9:30 AM), 
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penalize15 or prohibit16 a person entering into such an agreement with a 
business, or another individual from reviewing or assessing the 
performance of “the goods, services, or conduct”17 of that business or 
individual.  The law vests the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) with 
primary enforcement authority,18 but also allows state attorneys general and 
consumer protection officers to bring civil actions in federal court on behalf 
of their residents after clearing several procedural hurdles.19  The measure 
does not ban defamation20 actions filed by reviewed businesses or 
individuals when reviews are libelous.21 
Ken Paulson, president of the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt 
University and dean of the College of Media and Entertainment at Middle 
Tennessee State University, calls the new law “a valuable piece of 
legislation that prevents businesses from forcing consumers to give up their 
free speech rights.”22  The bill’s co-sponsor, Representative Lance, 
proclaimed after the measure cleared the Senate that it: 
 
[I]s about protecting consumers posting honest feedback 
online.  Online reviews and ratings are critical in the 
21st century and consumers should be able to post, 
comment and tweet their honest and accurate feedback 
without fear of retribution.  Too many companies are 
burying non-disparagement clauses in fine print and 
																																																																																																																													
https://consumerist.com/2016/12/14/consumer-review-freedom-act (“Seven years ago, we 
first told you about businesses using gag orders – call them ‘customer waivers’ or ‘non-
disparagement clauses,’ it’s all the same – to prevent their customers from exercising their 
legally protected rights to voice their honest opinions.”). 
14 The law defines a form contract as “a contract with standardized terms – (i) used by a 
person in the course of selling or leasing the person’s goods or services; and (ii) imposed on 
an individual without a meaningful opportunity for such individual to negotiate the 
standardized terms.”  15 U.S.C. § 45b(a)(3)(A) (2017). 
15 Id. § 45b(b)(1)(B) (rendering void a form contract that “imposes a penalty or fee 
against an individual who is a party to the form contract for engaging in a covered 
communication . . . .”). 
16 Id. § 45b(b)(1)(A) (rendering void a form contract that “prohibits or restricts the 
ability of an individual who is a party to the form contract to engage in a covered 
communication . . . .”). 
17 Id. § 15b(a)(2). 
18 See id. § 15b(d)(1)–(2). 
19 See id. § 15b(e)(1)–(6). 
20 Defamation “is the tort theory that provides a civil remedy for communications that 
harm a victim’s reputation.” Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for 
Communications Containing Allegedly Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
863, 868 (2003). 
21 15 U.S.C. §15b(b)(2)(B) (providing that the law shall not be construed to affect “any 
civil cause of action for defamation, libel, or slander, or any similar cause of action . . .”). 
22 Steven Porter, Businesses Barred from Gagging Customer Reviews Under New U.S. 
Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR. (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2016/1219/Businesses-barred-from-gagging-customer-
reviews-under-new-US-law.  
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going after consumers when they post negative feedback 
online.  This will now end.23 
 
Similarly, in announcing the bill in April, 2016, co-sponsor Representative 
Kennedy remarked that it “would ensure companies can never retaliate 
against customers for simply expressing an opinion.”24  In light of such 
lofty rhetoric, this article analyzes both the Consumer Review Fairness Act 
of 2016 and state laws targeting consumer-review gag clauses.  It 
contextualizes these statutes within the broader framework of First 
Amendment freedom of speech,25 which may prove irrelevant in purely 
contractual settings between private parties. 
Part I of the article explains more broadly the nature of non-
disparagement clauses and their emergence in recent years as contractual 
tools for stifling negative online reviews.26  Part II then evaluates the 
relevance, or lack thereof, of the First Amendment in thwarting non-
disparagement clauses.27  Next, Part III examines in greater depth the 
Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, as well as the two state efforts that 
preceded it in California28 and Maryland29 in combatting gag clauses.30  
Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting, at the macro-level of analysis, 
that the use of non-disparagement clauses to squelch free expression 
highlights the need for the Supreme Court31 to constitutionalize contract 
law with a First Amendment overlay, much as it already has done in tort 
																																																						
23 Press Release, Leonard Lance, Congressman, New Jersey’s 7th District, Speaker Ryan 
Signs Lance Bill (Dec. 2, 2016), https://lance.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/speaker-
ryan-signs-lance-bill.  
24 Press Release, Joe Kennedy, Congressman, 4th Dist. of Massachusetts, Kennedy, 
Lance Intro Bill to Protect Consumer Reviews (Apr. 28, 2016), 
https://kennedy.house.gov/media/press-releases/kennedy-lance-intro-bill-to-protect-
consumer-reviews.    
25 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ..”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I.  The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than 
ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental 
liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials.  See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
26 Infra notes 36–100 and accompanying text. 
27 Infra notes 101–138 and accompanying text. 
28 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.8 (West 2017). 
29 MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 14-1325 (West 2017). 
30 Infra notes 138-194 and accompanying text. 
31 All cites referring to the “Supreme Court” mean the United States Supreme Court, 
unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
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law with the cases of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,32 Hustler Magazine 
v. Falwell33 and Snyder v. Phelps,34 among other suggestions.35 
 
I.  GAGGING ONLINE CRITICS: THE RISE OF  
NON-DISPARAGEMENT CLAUSES 
 
This Part has two sections.  Section A provides an overview of non-
disparagement clauses, both historically and today.  Section B then 
describes a real-life example of the abuse of such provisions that captured 
the attention of the United States Congress. 
 
A. An Overview of the Problem 
 
The Consumer Review Fairness Act is an exemplar of timely legislation 
targeting a troublesome and growing problem.  As the ABA Journal 
reported in July 2016, some businesses increasingly are attempting “to 
prohibit dissatisfied customers from posting negative yet authentic 
reviews.”36  Earlier that year, the Washington Post noted that “non-
disparagement clauses in contracts are multiplying.”37   
These provisions detrimentally affect not only consumers, but also 
review-centric websites, such as Yelp.  Yelp “provides consumers with 
																																																						
32 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  In Sullivan, the Court held that public officials who sue for libel 
based on speech relating to their official duties must prove that the defamatory statement in 
question “was made with ‘actual malice’ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  Id. at 279-80.   
33 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  In Falwell, the Court held that public figures and public officials 
who sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) based on parodic and 
satirical speech must prove, in addition to the requisite IIED tort elements, “that the 
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with 
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was 
true.”  Id. at 56. 
34 562 U.S. 443 (2011).  In Snyder, which involved several tort causes of action, 
including ones for IIED and intrusion into seclusion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the 
majority that “[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment – ‘Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech’ – can serve as a defense in state tort suits, 
including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Id. at 451.  
35 Infra notes 194–232 and accompanying text. 
36 Julianne Hill, Stars and Gripes: Legal Challenges Over Online Reviews Seek to 
Separate Fact from Fiction, ABA J. (July 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/legal_challenges_over_online_reviews_seek_to
_separate_fact_from_fiction.  
37 Christopher Elliott, Write a Negative Review and Get Sued? It Can Happen, but 
Maybe Not for Long, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/write-a-negative-online-review-and-get-
sued-it-can-happen-but-maybe-not-for-long/2016/01/14/518f0aa6-b49b-11e5-9388-
466021d971de_story.html?utmterm=.63e143259066. 
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search and review features for restaurants, retailers and other businesses.”38  
It claimed in the first quarter of 2016 to have had “on a monthly average 
basis, about [seventy-seven] million unique visitors . . . on desktop 
computers and [sixty-nine] million on mobile devices . . . .”39  By the end of 
the fourth quarter of 2017, more than one hundred and forty-eight million 
reviews had been posted on Yelp, and “Yelp had a monthly average of 
[twenty-nine] million unique visitors who visited Yelp via the Yelp app.”40 
A common example of a non-disparagement contract term might involve 
“a vacation home rental owner who stipulates in the fine print of a contract 
that he may keep a deposit if a guest leaves an unflattering review.”41  As 
USA Today noted in December 2015, “[s]ome businesses are lurking with 
‘terms of service,’ often in fine print, that prohibit customers from writing 
negative reviews.  Such ‘gag clauses’ chill free speech and undermine 
consumer power.”42  Indeed, the same newspaper also pointed out that “an 
array of businesses across the country – wedding photographers, flooring 
installers, online retailers, hotels, vacation rentals, and even some dentists 
and doctors – have attempted to foist gag clauses on customers.”43  
Consumer advocates assert that “most customers aren’t aware of non-
disparagement clauses, which often are buried deep within boilerplate 
language of the agreements.”44  
When consumers upload negative reviews that violate gag clauses, they 
may be sued.45  For instance, a Texas couple was sued in 2016 after they 
breached a non-disparagement clause with a pet-sitting company called 
Prestigious Pets by posting a negative, one-star review of it on Yelp.46  The 
																																																						
38 James F. Peltz, After Yahoo, These Tech Firms Look Ripe for a Sale, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 
1, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-agenda-tech-mergers-20160801-
snap-htmlstory.html. 
39 Id.  
40 About Us, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/about (last visited May 2, 2018).  
41 See Elliot, supra note 37.  
42 Gag clauses' chill consumers' free speech: Our view, USA TODAY (Dec. 24, 2015, 
5:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/12/23/consumer-reviews-gag-first-
amendment-editorials-debates/77801050/.   
43 Id. 
44 Jenni Bergal, Consumers Now Have the Right to Gripe Online, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRS. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/12/15/consumers-now-have-the-right-to-gripe-online.   
45 See Joseph Dussault, What the Yelp Defamation Case Could Mean for Internet Free 
Speech, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 22, 2016), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2016/0922/What-the-Yelp-defamation-case-could-
mean-for-internet-free-speech (“A bipartisan bill, sponsored by Reps. Joe Kennedy (D) of 
Massachusetts and Leonard Lance (R) of New Jersey, seeks to protect customers against 
‘non-disparagement’ clauses imposed by businesses.  Customers have often signed such 
contracts, and they are sued after publishing a negative review.”). 
46 Sarah Mervosh, Plano Couple Sued for $1M over One-Star Yelp Review Asks Judge to 
Drop Suit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 3, 2016), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/06/03/plano-couple-hit-with-1m-lawsuit-over-
one-star-yelp-review-asks-judge-to-drop-suit. 
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gag clause at issue broadly provided that “your acceptance of this 
agreement prohibits you from taking any action that negatively impacts 
Prestigious Pets, LLC, its reputation, products, services, management, 
employees or independent contractors.”47  Texas District Court Judge Jim 
Jordan dismissed the company’s lawsuit with prejudice under the Lone Star 
State’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation)48 
statutes49 and awarded the defendant-couple, Robert and Michelle 
Duchouquette, court costs and attorneys’ fees to be paid by Prestigious Pets 
and its owner.50  According to attorney Paul Alan Levy of the Public 
Citizen Litigation Group, the case marked “the first time a company 
defended its non-disparagement clause with a brief,” and, perhaps more 
significantly, the first time a judge refused to enforce a consumer-review 
gag clause.51 
Although the outcome in that case was favorable from a pro-free speech 
perspective, the cost of breaching a gag clause can multiply fast because, as 
Professor Lucille Ponte recently notes, gag clauses frequently are 
accompanied by “liquidated damages clauses that set out daily penalties for 
posting a critical review until the posting is removed.”52  
Gag clauses tend, somewhat intuitively, to be viewpoint based, allowing 
favorable reviews while stifling only negative ones.  As Professor Ponte 
explains: 
 
These kinds of agreements are typically not purely 
contracts of silence that prohibit all speech, as positive 
reviews and comments are not only desirable but good 
for a business’s customer relationships and bottom line.  
Rather, a nondisparagement clause prevents consumers 
from making or posting any negative remarks, 
																																																						
47 Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, McWhorter v. 
Duchouquette, No. DC-16-03561 (Tex. Dist. Ct., July 19, 2016), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/PPTCPAOpposition.pdf.  
48 Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 n.30 (2006) (describing SLAPP as an acronym that stands 
for strategic lawsuit against public participation). 
49 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–27.011 (West 2016). 
50 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, McWhorter v. Duchouquette, No. DC-16-
03561 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Aug. 26, 2016), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3038039/Prestigious-Pets-Order-of-
Dismissal.pdf.  
51 Paul Alan Levy, Texas Court Strikes Down Prestigious Pets’ Nondisparagement 
Clause Lawsuit, PUB. CITIZEN CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2016/08/texas-court-strikes-down-prestigious-pets-
nondisparagement-clause-lawsuit.html.  
52 Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer “Gag” 
Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
59, 79 (2016). 
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criticisms, or ridicule about a business, its goods, and/or 
its services.53 
 
Some gag clauses, as attorneys David Bell and Tiffany Ferris write, 
“transfer copyright ownership in any review written about a particular 
business to that business.”54  This duplicitous intellectual property 
maneuver, the duo notes, “gives the business the right to have reviews 
removed from third-party review websites and forums . . . .”55  Indeed, the 
Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016 includes a provision that 
specifically addresses and voids such transfers of intellectual-property 
rights.56 
Gag clauses do more, however, than just extinguish criticism.  Professor 
Lauren Willis asserts, “they’re bad for the economy.  One way that markets 
become more efficient is by information getting out there, consumer to 
consumer.”57  In other words, two types of markets—literal economic ones, 
as well as metaphorical idea marketplaces58—are stunted by non-
disparagement clauses.  In fact, Paul Levy, an attorney for the watchdog 
group Public Citizen,59 stresses that gag clauses “hurt other businesses that 
																																																						
53 Ponte, supra note 52, at 67. 
54 David A. Bell & Tiffany Ferris, A Congressional Anti-Gag Maneuver: Senate 
Unanimously Approves the Consumer Review Freedom Act, HAYNES & BOONE, LLC (Jan. 
27, 2016), http://www.haynesboone.com/publications/a-congressional-anti-gag-maneuver. 
55 Id.  
56 15 U.S.C. § 45b(b)(1)(C) (2017). The new law voids a form contract if it: 
 
[T]ransfers or requires an individual who is a party to the form contract to transfer 
to any person any intellectual property rights in review or feedback content, with 
the exception of a non-exclusive license to use the content, that the individual 
may have in any otherwise lawful covered communication about such person or 
the goods or services provided by such person. 
 
Id. 
57 David Lazarus, Lawmakers Seek to End the Muzzling of Consumers by Some 
Businesses, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
lazarus-20150508-column.html. 
58 The marketplace of ideas theory of free expression “represents one of the most 
powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and for laypersons.”  MATTHEW D. 
BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH 2 (2001).  It has been described as “the dominant First 
Amendment metaphor.”  LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
237 (1991).  Dean Rodney Smolla calls the marketplace of ideas “perhaps the most powerful 
metaphor in the free speech tradition,” with its premise “that humankind’s search for truth is 
best advanced by a free trade in ideas.”  RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN 
SOCIETY 6 (1992).  In other words, under this theory, a primary “justification for free speech 
is that it contributes to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing 
Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003). 
59 Public Citizen describes itself on its website as “a nonprofit consumer advocacy 
organization that champions the public interest” and that “resist[s] corporate power and 
work[s] to ensure that government works for the people – not for big corporations.”  About 
Us, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2306 (last visited May 2, 2018). 
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operate on the up-and-up and don’t need these clauses to protect 
themselves.”60   
Ultimately, the use of gag clauses “threatens the openness of the digital 
economy.”61  They thus fall within what Professor David Orozco recently 
called “a broad array of strategic corporate legal bullying practices that 
violate fundamental business norms such as fairness, reciprocity, 
reputation, and community responsiveness.”62 
The FTC began taking action against non-disparagement clauses in 
2015. That is when it accused weight-loss powder marketer Roca Labs of 
using gag clauses to stop negative reviews of its multimillion-dollar 
business.63  As the FTC asserted in a press release, Florida-based Roca Labs 
“attempted to intimidate their own customers from sharing truthful – and 
truly negative – reviews of their products.”64   
The FTC’s complaint, filed September 2015 in federal court against 
Roca Labs and two of its officers, alleges that Roca’s use of gag clauses 
“have caused or are likely to cause purchasers to refrain from commenting 
negatively about the Defendants or their products.  By depriving 
prospective purchasers of this truthful, negative information, Defendants’ 
practices have resulted or are likely to result in consumers buying Roca 
Labs products they would not otherwise have bought.”65  The FTC contends 
that gag clauses “constitute unfair acts or practices in violation of Section 5 
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) and (n).”66  The gag clause in Roca Labs’ 
online agreement provided: 
																																																						
60 Jennie Bergal, The Right to Gripe: States Seek to Protect Negative Online Reviews, 
PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (June 16, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/06/16/the-right-to-gripe-states-seek-to-protect-negative-online-
reviews. 
61 Reid Goldsborough, The Do’s and Don’t’s of Free Speech Online, INFO. TODAY INC. 
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.infotoday.com/LinkUp/The-Dos-and-Donts-of-Free-Speech-
Online-108310.shtml. 
62 David Orozco, Strategic Legal Bullying, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 137, 140 (2016).  As 
Orozco writes, “[t]o silence negative critiques made against them, companies sometimes 
assert tenuous disparagement claims against individuals or small businesses who make 
negative statements.  These entities abuse the legal system by threatening legal action to 
silence any negative criticism.” Id. at 168. 
63 John Hielscher, FTC Sues Sarasota Firm, Alleging False Claims, SARASOTA HERALD 
TRIB. (Oct. 2, 2015, 4:09 PM). 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20151002/News/605203848/SH/. 
64 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Marketers Who Used “Gag Clauses,” 
Monetary Threats, and Lawsuits to Stop Negative Consumer Reviews for Unproven Weight-
Loss Products (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/09/ftc-
sues-marketers-who-used-gag-clauses-monetary-threats-lawsuits.  
65 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 22, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Roca Labs, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-02231-MSS-TBM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150928rocalabscmpt.pdf. 
66 Id. at 28.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2016) (“Unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 
hereby declared unlawful.”); Id. § 45(n) (providing the FTC with the power to declare 
 
 
2018] Gag Clauses and The Right to Gripe  213 
 
You agree that regardless of your personal experience 
with RL, you will not disparage RL and/or any of its 
employees, products, or services.  This means that you 
will not speak, publish, or cause to be published, print, 
review, blog, or otherwise write negatively about RL, or 
its products or employees in any way.67 
 
By April, 2016, the FTC and Roca Labs reportedly were on the verge of 
settling the matter,68 but the case was still ongoing in early 2017.69  
Signaling, perhaps, that the FTC might fight other businesses that deploy 
such gag clauses, FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny highlighted the 
case against Roca Labs in a November 2016 keynote speech at the 
Association of National Advertisers and Brand Activation Association’s 
marketing law conference in Chicago.70  
Despite the FTC’s recent actions targeting them, gag clauses are not 
new.  Traditionally, they were applied in contexts other than online 
business reviews.  For example, the New York Times reported in 1996 that 
health maintenance organizations (“H.M.O.s”) were imposing gag clauses 
on physicians that “limited their ability to talk freely with patients about 
treatment options and H.M.O. payment policies.”71   
																																																																																																																													
unlawful an “act or practice [that] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”). 
67 Lesley Fair, Gagging Rights?  FTC Case Challenges Diet Claims and Company’s Use 
of Consumer Gag Clauses, FTC BUS. BLOG (Sept. 28, 2015, 9:13 AM), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/09/gagging-rights-ftc-case-
challenges-diet-claims-companys-use. 
68 Dani Kass, FTC, Supplement Co. Request Stay in False Ad Suit, LAW360 (Apr. 18, 
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/785821/ftc-supplement-co-request-stay-in-false-ad-
suit.  
69 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Roca Labs, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5298 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 13, 2017) (involving a motion for contempt and sanctions against a non-party witness in 
the case). 
70 Terrell McSweeny, FTC Commissioner, Keynote Remarks at the 2016 ANA/BAA 
Marketing Law Conference (Nov. 10, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/996554/mcsweeny_-
_keynote_remarks_at_ana-baa_marketing_law_conference_11-10-16.pdf. 
71 Associated Press, U.S. Healthcare to End Limits on Doctors’ Advice to Patients, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 6, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/06/business/us-healthcare-to-end-
limits-on-doctors-advice-to-patients.html. See Robert Pear, Doctors Say H.M.O.’s Limit 
What They Can Tell Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/21/us/doctors-say-hmo-s-limit-what-they-can-tell-
patients.html (“Doctors across the country say that health maintenance organizations 
routinely limit their ability to talk freely with patients about treatment options and H.M.O. 
payment policies, including financial bonuses for doctors who save money by withholding 
care.”). 
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Although the actual extent of the use of gag clauses affecting doctors 
was “hotly contested,”72 the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services quickly stepped into the fray to hold that “H.M.O.’s may 
not limit what doctors tell Medicare patients about medical treatment 
options.”73  Multiple states also took legislative action against gag clauses 
in H.M.O. contracts.74  By 1999, as Professor William Sage wrote in the 
Columbia Law Review, “nearly every state [had] enacted legislation 
outlawing contractual restrictions on disclosure” in managed-care 
contracts.”75  In brief, there is ample precedent for lawmakers taking 
effective action against gag clauses.   
While gag clauses in H.M.O. contracts may be a relic of the past, they 
are “increasingly common” today in contexts beyond consumer reviews, 
such as employment contracts, where they ban “former employees from 
criticizing their erstwhile employer.”76  Additionally, as Professor Genelle 
Belmas and attorney Brian Larson observed in 2007, “[s]oftware 
manufacturers have also included clauses that forbid publication of any 
review of their products without consent.”77  Furthermore, the New York 
Times reported in June 2016 that a number of for-profit universities include 
enrollment contracts featuring gag clauses that: 
 
[B]ar students or former students from telling others 
about the complaint resolution process or the specifics of 
any final ruling.  And internal process requirements 
prohibit students from taking their complaints public 
without first going through the school’s own process.  In 
some cases, schools try to bar people from taking 
complaints elsewhere – even if the internal process 
yields no relief.78 
																																																						
72 Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag 
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Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 37-38 (2007). 
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A 2016 study by the Century Foundation79 “found gag clauses in about 
one in every ten enrollment contracts at for-profit colleges receiving federal 
aid.  No such provisions were found at nonprofit, public, or privately 
funded for-profit institutions.”80  The study noted that an enrollment-
contract gag clause “inserts a firewall between wronged students, reducing 
the likelihood that they will learn about each other’s complaints, preventing 
them from working together to seek a better resolution.”81 
The next section turns to a real-life example that vividly demonstrates 
the destructive impact of gag clauses not only on free expression, but also 
on individual emotional tranquility and familial fiscal stability. 
 
B. The Case of Jennifer Palmer 
 
In November 2015, during testimony before the United States Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Jennifer Palmer 
explained how a non-disparagement clause, supposedly buried in a terms-
of-sale-and-use agreement with an online business called KlearGear, 
wreaked havoc on both her life and her husband’s credit rating.82  
Specifically, in late 2008 her husband, John Palmer, ordered and paid for 
two items online from KlearGear.83  After the items never arrived, the 
Palmers were told via email by a KlearGear representative that the order 
was unpaid and therefore cancelled.84  The Palmers were never able to 
speak with anyone at KlearGear, however, because the phone numbers on 
the company’s website merely provided automated responses.85  
Growing frustrated with the service and what she called “the 
impossibility of reaching anyone,”86 Jennifer then took a step in February 
2009 that would later haunt her and her husband: she posted her opinions 
about KlearGear on a website called RipoffReport.com.87  It was not until 
																																																						
79 This organization describes itself as “a progressive, nonpartisan think tank that seeks 
to foster opportunity, reduce inequality, and promote security at home and abroad.” About 
the Century Foundation, CENTURY FOUND., https://tcf.org/about (last visited May 2, 2018). 
80 Tariq Habash & Robert Shireman, How College Enrollment Contracts Limit Students’ 
Rights, CENTURY FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2016), https://tcf.org/content/report/how-college-
enrollment-contracts-limit-students-rights. 
81 Habash & Shireman, supra note 80.  
82 Zero Stars: How Gagging Honest Reviews Harms Consumers and the Economy: 
Hearing on S. 2044 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 114th Cong. (2015) 
[hereinafter “Palmer Testimony”] (statement of Jennifer Kulas Palmer, Plaintiff, Palmer v. 
KlearGear), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/2966d0eb-8812-4035-
ae59-4b75979864e4/93F3E6B5DE58928F85DF4367AEC0373A.jen-palmer-testimony.pdf. 
83 Id. at 1. 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
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May, 2012 that the trouble started.  That’s when, as Jennifer testified, her 
husband: 
 
[R]eceived an email from KlearGear demanding that 
John have the review on RipoffReport.com removed 
within 72 hours, or pay KlearGear $3,500 for violations 
of their Terms of Sale and Use. . . . KlearGear claimed 
that my review violated a “non-disparagement clause” in 
KlearGear’s Terms of Sale and Use, the text of which 
barred the customer – who was John, not me, but that 
didn’t matter to them – from “taking any action that 
negatively impacts KlearGear.com, its reputation, 
products, services, management or employees.”  John 
did some research . . . and discover[ed] that the clause 
wasn’t even present in the Terms of Sale when he placed 
his order back in December 2008.  He found that the 
clause did not appear until February 2012.  
 
Jennifer attempted to remove her review, but as she told the Senators at the 
hearing, RipoffReport.com’s policy prohibits removals.88  She testified that 
her husband then: 
 
[T]ried explaining to KlearGear that the “non-
disparagement clause” was not in the Terms of Sale and 
Use at the time of John’s order from KlearGear; that it 
was I, not John, who wrote the review; and 
RipoffReport.com’s policy of not removing reviews 
meant we had no control over whether the review 
remained online.  The person claiming to be KlearGear’s 
legal representative just reiterated to us that “this matter 
will remain open until the published content is 
removed,” and threatened to report the $3,500 as a debt 
to the credit reporting agencies.89  
 
Indeed, the $3,500 later showed up as debt owed to KlearGear on John 
Palmer’s credit reports with Experian and Equifax, two of the three major 
credit-reporting companies in the United States.90  Jennifer testified that it 
took more than eighteen months to remove the information from her 
husband’s credit reports91—a result coming only after the watch-dog group 
																																																						
88 Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 1-2. 
89 Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 2. 
90 Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 2. 
91 Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 2. 
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Public Citizen filed suit on the Palmers’ behalf against KlearGear.92  The 
Palmers won a default judgment against KlearGear, which failed to defend 
the case.93 
Before the lawsuit and prior to the removal of the KlearGear debt from 
John Palmer’s credit record, however, he experienced difficulty obtaining a 
car loan and was denied a credit card.94  The Palmers were also refused 
financing by several companies for buying a new furnace after their old one 
broke as winter approached.95   
On top of the fiscal woes, Jennifer further testified about the emotional 
toll, noting “the humiliation of having to explain everything”96 and “living 
in fear”97 of “not being able to get emergency credit for basic needs.”98  In 
fact, one of the causes of action in the Palmers’ complaint filed in federal 
court in Utah was for intentional infliction of emotional distress.99  
The bottom line, as Jennifer explained, was that her “story shows what 
can happen when companies are allowed to use non-disparagement clauses 
in their contracts to bully consumers.  And it shows why Congress should 
take action to prohibit the use of these clauses in consumer contracts.”100  
Congress now has done precisely that with the Consumer Review Fairness 
Act of 2016.  
With this background on non-disparagement clauses and the real-world 
example of the Palmers in mind, Part II addresses the bearing and 
significance of the First Amendment on the enforceability of these 
contractual terms. 
 
II. GAG CLAUSES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: IS THERE A 
CONSTITUTIONAL OVERLAY TO CONTRACT LAW? 
 
More than a quarter-century ago, First Amendment scholar Vincent 
Blasi of checking-value fame101 ruefully queried about gag clauses, “You 
																																																						
92 Complaint, Palmer v. KlearGear.com, No. 1:13-cv-00175 (D. Utah Dec. 18, 2013) 
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93 Palmer Testimony, supra note 82, at 3.  
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99 Palmer Complaint, supra note 92, at 15.  The tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
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can’t sell yourself into slavery.  So can you sell yourself into silence?  It 
would seem to me there are some inalienable rights you can’t sign away.”102  
It is a critical, yet relatively understudied, issue.  As Professor Alan 
Garfield observed in 1998, “[t]he extent to which a party can bind himself 
contractually to silence is largely unexplored in American case law and 
legal literature.”103 
If the First Amendment were to apply to gag clauses, then its general 
prohibition against prior restraints104 would be directly relevant.  A prior 
restraint, the Supreme Court has held, is a “restraint on future speech,”105 
often occurring in the form of “court orders that actually forbid speech 
activities.”106  It is a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence, 
in turn, that prior restraints on speech are presumptively unconstitutional.107   
Although gag clauses prohibiting negative reviews certainly restrict 
future expression, the threshold problem in challenging their 
constitutionality is that the First Amendment protects the right of free 
expression only from government action.108  As the Supreme Court wrote 
four decades ago, “the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee 
only against abridgment by government, federal or state.”109  It then added 
that “while statutory or common law may in some situations extend 
protection or provide redress against a private corporation or person who 
seeks to abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or redress 
is provided by the Constitution itself.”110   
This militates, of course, against the First Amendment playing any role 
in thwarting the application of a gag clause in a contract between a business 
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and a consumer.  Simply put, a contractual gag clause may fall within the 
realm of private law,111 not constitutional law.  
In his 1998 article, Professor Garfield thus raised a crucial question 
regarding the intersection of contract law, gag clauses, which fall within a 
larger bucket of “contracts of silence,”112 as he aptly puts it, and the First 
Amendment: “Are promises of silence different because they implicate the 
First Amendment or violate a public policy favoring freedom of speech, or 
are these constitutional and policy concerns irrelevant when a private party 
agrees to silence himself?”113   
On the one hand, Professor Garfield observes that “whereas the First 
Amendment limits governmental suppression of speech, contractual 
suppression of speech may not implicate the First Amendment.”114  
Attorney Randolph Kline and his colleagues concur, noting that the First 
Amendment does not “preclude agreements to limit one’s own speech.  In 
fact, private parties can voluntarily negotiate agreements among themselves 
. . . to limit the speech rights the parties would otherwise possess.”115  
Similarly, in addressing the problem of gag clauses found in software 
license agreements, Professors Michael Rustad and Maria Onufrio wrote in 
2012 that “[w]hen software licensors or other content providers impose 
restrictions on speech, the First Amendment prohibition on prior restraints 
is not applicable since there is no state action.”116  Furthermore, Professor 
Kaiponanea Matsumurd in 2014 asserted that “agreements restricting free 
speech,”117 in fact, “are routinely enforced”118 and that “the long-term trend 
has favored”119 contractual waivers of speech rights.   
Thus, while the First Amendment may limit the scope of speech-based 
torts,120 it generally has no application in contract law.  As Professors 
Daniel Solove and Neil Richards sum it up, “[a]lthough tort law implicates 
the First Amendment under modern constitutional jurisprudence, the First 
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Amendment provides little to no restrictions when other private law rules 
restrict speech.  Such is the case with contract law and property law.”121 
The case of Cohen v. Cowles Media122 provides some evidence of this.  
There, the Court held that the First Amendment provided no defense against 
a civil cause of action for promissory estoppel stemming from the breach of 
a promise of confidentiality given by journalists to a source.123  As UCLA 
Professor Eugene Volokh encapsulates the holding at its broadest, “[t]he 
Supreme Court explicitly held in Cohen v. Cowles Media that contracts not 
to speak are enforceable with no First Amendment problems.  Enforcing 
people’s own bargains, the Court concluded . .  . doesn’t violate those 
people’s rights, even if they change their minds after the bargain is 
struck.”124 
Nonetheless, as Professor Shelley Ross Saxer writes, the Court in Cohen 
“found state action in a private breach of contract lawsuit involving a 
confidential source who sued the newspaper company that exposed him 
after agreeing to keep him anonymous.”125  On this issue, the Court in 
Cohen wrote that “the application of state rules of law in state courts in a 
manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes ‘state 
action’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”126  Byron White reasoned for 
the five-justice majority that the state-law doctrine of promissory estoppel 
“would be enforced through the official power of the Minnesota courts.  
Under our cases, that is enough to constitute ‘state action’ for purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”127   
In brief, judicial enforcement of state contract law theory was sufficient 
to trigger consideration of the First Amendment by the Court in Cohen 
under principles of state action.  Nonetheless, the First Amendment failed 
to add a layer of constitutional protection because, as the Cohen Court 
reasoned, generally applicable laws such as promissory estoppel “do not 
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the 
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”128 
Addressing the state action question, Professor Garfield points out that 
“[j]udicial enforcement of a contract of silence may constitute state action 
and thus implicate the First Amendment.”129  Most courts, however, do not 
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recognize the proposition that judicial enforcement, by itself, constitutes 
state action.  For instance, in April 2016 a federal district court in California 
turned back a First Amendment challenge to a contractual arbitration 
agreement by rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument “that the mere fact of 
judicial enforcement automatically establishes state action.”130  Indeed, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2013 opined that 
“[i]n the context of First Amendment challenges to speech-restrictive 
provisions in private agreements or contracts, domestic judicial 
enforcement of terms that could not be enacted by the government has not 
ordinarily been considered state action.”131 
In fact, as Professor Mark Rosen observed in a 2004 article, “with 
virtually no exceptions, courts have concluded that the judicial enforcement 
of private agreements inhibiting speech does not trigger constitutional 
review, despite the fact that identical legislative limitations on speech 
would have.”132  Put even more bluntly by a Washington state appellate 
court, “[s]tate enforcement of a contract between two private parties is not 
state action, even where one party’s free speech rights are restricted by that 
agreement.”133 
Yet Professor Garfield emphasizes that the Supreme Court has long 
applied a First Amendment overlay to state tort law,134 with recent cases 
like Snyder v. Phelps135 illustrating this point.  As Chief Justice John 
Roberts observed for the eight-justice Snyder majority, “[t]he Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment—‘Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech’—can serve as a defense in state tort suits, 
including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”136  In other 
words, if a veneer of First Amendment jurisprudence can coat tort law, then 
why can that amendment not similarly add a layer of constitutional 
protection to contract law?  
Ultimately, Garfield concludes, “there is no obvious answer”137 
regarding whether the First Amendment imposes restrictions on gag clauses 
entered into freely between private parties.  He adds that even if the state 
action of judicial enforcement makes the First Amendment applicable to 
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contracts of silence, this still fails to resolve whether such a constitutional 
right may be waived.138   
With this unsettled state of First Amendment jurisprudence leaving a 
gaping chasm between the speech interests of consumers and the 
contractual rights of businesses to protect their reputations, both the federal 
government and several states now are filling the void with statutes 
rendering non-disparagement clauses invalid.  Those laws are examined 
below in Part III. 
 
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO GAG CLAUSES: ANALYZING FEDERAL 
AND STATE “RIGHT TO GRIPE” STATUTES 
 
This Part features two sections.  Section A examines the federal 
Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, while Section B analyzes the 
legislative efforts of both California and Maryland.  They were the first two 
states to tackle consumer-review gag clauses with legislation that predates 
the new federal statute. 
 
A. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016 
 
A starting point for this analysis is the Consumer Review Fairness Act’s 
definition of a non-disparagement clause.  The Act, however, does not use 
either the term “non-disparagement clause” or “gag clause.”  Instead, it 
employs the more neutral term “covered communication,”139 which it 
defines as “a written, oral, or pictorial review,140 performance assessment 
of, or other similar analysis of, including by electronic means, the goods, 
services, or conduct of a person by an individual who is party to a form 
contract with respect to which such person is also a party.”141  
This definition allows consumers to post reviews consisting of both 
words and images.  For instance, a person who believes a kitchen-cabinet 
installer shoddily performed work could not only describe, via written text, 
why she thinks the work was shoddy, but also post photographs and/or 
videos offering seemingly more objective proof of inferior performance.  
Such visual evidence is important because, as Chief Justice John Roberts’ 
pointed out in 2012, “a picture is worth a thousand words.”142   
Second, it is important to understand that the Act does not ban all non-
disparagement clauses.  Specifically, it applies only when such clauses 
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appear in form contracts.143  Form contracts, per the statute, must: (i) 
involve “standardized terms;”144 (ii) for the “selling or leasing of goods or 
services”;145 and (iii) fail to provide a consumer with “a meaningful 
opportunity . . . to negotiate the standardized terms.”146   
The Act’s deployment of the term “form contract”147 may be strategic 
because it conjures up visions of adhesion contracts, which carry more than 
a whiff of unfairness.  Indeed, contracts of adhesion, Professor Shelley 
Smith writes, “are standardized form contracts presented by a party with 
superior bargaining power to the ‘adherent’ as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
proposition, giving them no alternatives other than complete adherence to 
the terms presented or outright rejection.”148  Such contracts, however, 
typically are enforceable under contract law principles149 unless the waiver 
of rights in question is so vast and broad as to be unconscionable150 and 
involves “a powerless party, usually a consumer, who has no real choice but 
to accede to its terms.”151 
Unconscionability, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit wrote in 2016, “has ‘both a procedural and a substantive element, 
the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining 
power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.’”152  As Professor 
Andrea Boyack recently summarized it: 
 
Adhesion contracts are enforceable, but legal theory has 
evolved to take into account the lack of voluntariness 
and content input inherent in adhesion contexts through 
modern doctrines such as unconscionability and distinct 
approaches to interpretation for adhesion contracts.  
Courts recognize that traditional deference to contractual 
terms may be inappropriate for contracts of adhesion, 
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and they therefore sometimes monitor the substantive 
fairness of a contract in an adhesion contract context.153  
 
In addition to applying only to gag clauses found in form contracts, the 
Consumer Review Fairness Act carves out multiple exemptions that truly 
limit its reach to only consumer reviews.  For example, employer-employee 
contracts and independent-contractor agreements fall outside the Act’s 
ambit.154  Additionally, the Act generally does not apply to non-disclosure 
provisions affecting trade secrets,155 personnel files,156 medical 
information157 and records compiled for law enforcement purposes.158 
As explained earlier, in 2015, the FTC began attacking gag clauses as a 
type of unfair business practice when it filed a complaint against weight-
loss marketer Roca Labs.159  The Consumer Review Fairness Act now 
specifically codifies gag clauses in form contracts that fall within the Act’s 
reach as unfair and deceptive practices.160  In turn, it gives the FTC the 
power to enforce the Act.161 
State attorneys general, as well as other authorized state consumer 
protection officers,162 also can file civil lawsuits on behalf of their residents 
under the Act,163 provided they, unless otherwise unfeasible,164 first notify 
the FTC in writing of their intent to bring such a claim165 and accompany it 
with “a copy of the complaint to be filed to initiate the civil action.”166  The 
FTC may intervene in such state-driven lawsuits.167 
Although the Consumer Review Fairness Act now applies nationwide as 
federal legislation, both California and Maryland previously adopted their 
own statutes targeting gag clauses.  Those statutes, which remain valid and 
thus provide a second layer of remedies for citizens in those states, are 
addressed below in Section B. 
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B. State Legislation 
 
Prior to enactment of the federal Consumer Review Fairness Act of 
2016, California and Maryland were the first states to implement laws 
striking at the enforcement of non-disparagement clauses in consumer 
contracts.  These two state statutes are described below, thus adding 
enriched context for understanding the federal legislation. 
 
 1. California 
 
Assembly Bill 2365, commonly referred to as the “Yelp bill,”168 was 
signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown in September 2014 and took 
effect on January 1, 2015.169  The measure, Professor Eric Goldman 
observes, became the “first-in-the-nation statute to stop businesses from 
contractually gagging their consumers.”170 
Codified at Section 1670.8 of the California Civil Code,171 the law is 
much briefer in both length and number of clauses than the Consumer 
Review Fairness Act of 2016.  The California law provides, in key part, that 
“[a] contract or proposed contract for the sale or lease of consumer goods or 
services may not include a provision waiving the consumer’s right to make 
any statement regarding the seller or lessor or its employees or agents, or 
concerning the goods or services.”172 
Unlike the federal legislation discussed earlier, this provision is not 
limited in applicability to only form contracts.  Additionally, and in contrast 
to the federal statute, California’s statute does not carve out an exemption 
for employer-employee contracts and independent-contractor agreements. 
In terms of enforcement, the California statute embraces a tripartite tack.  
Specifically, it allows consumers, the state attorney general, and local 
officials (both district and county attorneys) to file civil actions.173  A first 
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violation is subject to a maximum civil fine of $2,500, while second and 
subsequent breaches cost $5,000.174  
Furthermore, the California statute includes a provision closely akin to a 
punitive damages clause.  In particular, consumers or government officials 
may collect an additional maximum of $10,000 if they can prove a 
defendant’s violation of the statute was “willful, intentional, or reckless.”175 
Although the sum of those fines initially seems paltry, they still will 
likely cause a chilling effect on gag clause usage in California.  As 
Professor Goldman puts it, “[t]he penalties may be financially modest, but 
any California business that is foolish enough to take an anti-review 
contract to court will end up writing a check to their customers.”176 
Significantly, California’s law stretches beyond the state’s borders.  As 
attorney Songmee Connolly explains, the measure “has no geographic 
limitations and thus would apply to any consumer-facing entity or person 
doing business in California.  Thus, even out-of-state businesses with 
prospective and current customers in California should ensure 
compliance.”177 
Finally, the California statute makes it clear that a citizen of the Golden 
State can bring a lawsuit under California Civil Code § 1670.8 and any 
other statutory or common law theory.178  Accordingly, California citizens 
can invoke their state’s own statute targeting gag clauses and also request 
the state’s attorney general to pursue a separate claim under the federal 
Consumer Review Fairness Act.179 
 
 2. Maryland  
 
House Bill 131, better known as the “Right to Yelp” bill,180 was signed 
into law by Maryland Governor Lawrence Hogan, Jr., on April 12, 2016.181  
Hogan’s stroke of the pen made the Old Line State just the second in the 
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nation, following California’s lead, to adopt a law banning consumer-
review gag clauses.182   
Codified at Section 14-1325 of Maryland’s commercial code, the new 
legislation took effect in October 2016.183  Applying only to contracts 
involving “the sale or lease of consumer goods or services,”184 the statute 
renders “void and unenforceable”185 clauses that waive a “consumer’s right 
to make any statement concerning: (1) The seller or lessor; (2) Employees 
or agents of the seller or lessor; or (3) The consumer goods or services.”186  
It also prohibits enforcement and threatened enforcement of such clauses, 
as well as efforts to penalize consumers under such clauses.187 
Maryland’s statute specifies two items that California’s gag-clause law 
fails to address.  In particular, and unlike California’s measure, Maryland’s 
statute provides that individuals and businesses that believe they are 
defamed in consumer reviews retain the power to file libel actions.188  
Additionally, the Maryland statute exempts from its reach gag clauses 
restricting consumer disclosure of trade secrets and intellectual property.189  
California’s statute, in contrast, is silent on this type of content.  In accord 
with California’s measure,190 however, Maryland makes it clear that its law 
generally does not restrict the ability of consumer-review websites such as 
Yelp or TripAdvisor to take down reviews.191  
In terms of enforcement authority, the Maryland statute provides that 
violations of it constitute “unfair and deceptive trade practice[s]”192 under 
Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act and, in turn, are “[s]ubject to the 
enforcement and penalty provisions contained in Title 13 of this article.”193  
What does this mean?  The general criminal penalty provision of Title 13 
provides that “any person who violates any provision of this title is guilty of 
a misdemeanor and, unless another criminal penalty is specifically provided 
elsewhere, on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or 
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imprisonment not exceeding one year or both, in addition to any civil 
penalties.”194 
With this analysis of both the federal Consumer Review Protection Act 
and the California and Maryland non-disparagement statutes in mind, this 
article concludes by calling on the Supreme Court to adopt a layer of First 
Amendment protection to cover contract law cases in which an undue 
burden is imposed on free expression.  This approach, as becomes clear, 
borrows a test from another constitutional law domain – namely, the 
Court’s current abortion-barrier jurisprudence. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Both state laws and the federal Consumer Review Fairness Act may 
successfully eradicate the pernicious effects of non-disparagement clauses 
lurking in contracts between consumers and businesses.  For this, these 
articles of legislation merit praise and, in turn, the lawmakers behind them 
deserve kudos. 
Yet the larger constitutional question regarding the First Amendment’s 
role in this contractual space lingers unresolved.195  Although not focusing 
his analysis directly on gag clauses, Professor Donald Smythe lays a 
possible foundation for the First Amendment to play such a part, at least 
when contracts involve fictitious, state-created entities such as corporations.  
Smythe argues: 
 
[S]ince corporations are State-sponsored entities with 
rights and privileges that individuals do not enjoy, 
private transactions between individuals and 
corporations raise questions about the nature of the State 
sponsorship and its implications for the liberty of the 
individuals. If liberty requires not just that individuals be 
as free from coercion as possible, but also that they have 
spheres of personal autonomy and privacy, and if the 
transactions between individuals and corporations 
intrude into individuals’ spheres of personal autonomy 
and privacy, then the State may indirectly contribute to 
the impingement upon the liberty of individuals through 
its sponsorship of the corporations.196 
 
In brief, the personal and individual autonomy of deciding whether or 
not to speak is hindered by government-sanctioned businesses via gag 
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clauses buried in form contracts, thus providing an entrée for First 
Amendment applicability.  Furthermore, in addition to impeding speakers’ 
rights, gag clauses also harm the rights of others – namely, the thousands of 
people who visit consumer-review websites – to learn important 
information that might very well influence where, how and on what goods 
and services they spend money.  Here, the unenumerated First Amendment 
right to receive speech is deployable for buttressing the argument that 
speaker autonomy is thwarted by gag clauses.197  As the Supreme Court 
wrote more than a half-century ago, “the right of freedom of speech and 
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to 
distribute, the right to receive, the right to read.”198   
The First Amendment right to receive speech is exceptionally powerful 
in precisely the same commercial and business contexts in which consumer-
review gag clauses lurk and fester.  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
recognized more than forty years ago in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.199 that society has a “strong 
interest in the free flow of commercial information.”200  It explained why 
this is so when economic decisions are at stake: 
 
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise 
economy, the allocation of our resources in large 
measure will be made through numerous private 
economic decisions.  It is a matter of public interest that 
those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well 
informed.  To this end, the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensable.201 
 
In accord with this logic, the unfettered flow of opinions and reviews 
regarding businesses, services and products directly facilitates a “free 
enterprise economy”202 by helping to ensure that “economic decisions”203 of 
other potential consumers are “intelligent and well informed.”204  Gag 
clauses throttle this process.  The bottom line is that corporations, as 
government-sanctioned businesses, harm the rights of both speakers 
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(consumers) and audiences (potential consumers) through the inclusion of 
non-disparagement clauses. 
Adding to the impetus for applying the First Amendment to cases 
involving consumer non-disparagement clauses is the unequal nature of the 
bargaining power between the individuals and entities involved.  As 
Professor Garfield argues, “not all contractual promises of silence should be 
treated alike.  Surely there is a difference between contracts entered into by 
two parties of equal bargaining power and adhesion contracts signed by 
employees or ‘clicked’ onto by consumers.”205 
Yet, as Part III made clear, adhesion contracts generally are 
enforceable.206  For example, one federal court noted that “an adhesion 
contract is enforceable unless the plaintiff lacked a meaningful choice 
whether to accept the provision in question and the provision is ‘so one-
sided as to be oppressive.’”207  Put slightly differently by another court, 
“adhesion contracts are enforceable unless unconscionable,” and “[t]o 
establish unconscionability, the plaintiffs must prove both that they lacked a 
meaningful choice and that the terms of the contract were unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”208   
The mere fact, however, that consumers fail to read the terms of online 
agreements and therefore overlook inclusion of gag clauses is unlikely to 
render such contracts unconscionable.  To wit, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit notes that “[a] contract need not be read to 
be effective; people who accept take the risk that the unread terms may in 
retrospect prove unwelcome.”209  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Iowa calls it 
“well-settled that failure to read a contract before signing it will not 
invalidate the contract.”210 
Thus, to render a consumer-review gag clause invalid in the absence of 
either the Consumer Review Fairness Act or similar state laws, a court not 
only must find that the contract entered into by a consumer was, in fact, one 
of adhesion, but also that it was unconscionable.  This entails convincing a 
judge of procedural unconscionability – perhaps the gag clause was in 
smaller print than the rest of the agreement, was buried deep into the 
agreement and/or was written vaguely or confusingly – and substantive 
unconscionability.  The substantive argument, in turn, needs to be that it is 
an overly harsh, one-sided result211 for a person to forfeit his or her right to 
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publicly criticize – but not, conversely, to laud or praise – a business, 
thereby depriving others of possibly truthful information that might affect 
their fiscal decisions. 
A better approach, however, is for the Supreme Court to adopt a layer of 
First Amendment protection when a form contract detrimentally affects an 
individual’s right to express an opinion regarding the goods, services or 
performance of the other party to the contract.  Just as the First Amendment 
plays such a role today in the realm of common law torts like libel212 and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress,213 so too could it play a similar 
speech-protective role in the face of contractual gag clauses. 
The devil, of course, is in the details of determining precisely when and 
what contractual conditions should trigger the First Amendment’s 
application.  A complete analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
article, which instead focuses on legislative tacks, such as the Consumer 
Review Fairness Act, for addressing gag clauses.  Nonetheless, one 
intriguing possibility is to borrow a standard that now controls the Supreme 
Court’s abortion-impediment jurisprudence.  
Specifically, the Court in 2016 in Whole Women’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt214 applied an undue burden standard215 to determine if two 
Texas statutes adopted in 2013 violated a woman’s constitutional right to 
choose to have an abortion.216  One statute required physicians who perform 
abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles,217 
while the other mandated that abortion clinics comply with state regulations 
governing ambulatory surgical centers.218 
Writing for a five-justice majority, Stephen Breyer wrote that “neither of 
these provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens 
upon access that each imposes.  Each places a substantial obstacle in the 
path of women seeking a previability abortion, each constitutes an undue 
burden on abortion access, and each violates the Federal Constitution.”219  
Justice Breyer explained that the undue burden standard, derived from the 
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Court’s 1992 ruling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey,220 “asks courts to consider whether any burden imposed on 
abortion access is ‘undue’”221 and “requires that courts consider the burdens 
a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws 
confer.”222  
As Professor Jessie Hill explains, “[b]y focusing on the health benefits 
of the law in relation to the burdens, the Court made sense of, and breathed 
new life into, the undue burden standard.”223  Dean Erwin Chemerinsky 
writes that in Hellerstedt, the Court “stressed that in deciding whether a law 
imposes an undue burden on abortion it is for the judiciary to balance the 
justifications for the restrictions against their effect on the ability of women 
to have access to abortions.”224 
What might the undue burden standard, which considers both the 
benefits and burdens of abortion-access restrictions, look like if applied to 
contractual obligations curbing speech?  First and importantly, the standard 
recognizes that in some instances a restriction on a party’s speech rights 
may actually carry significant benefits.  This might be so, for instance, in 
the realm of confidentiality clauses in employer-employee contracts that 
prevent disclosure by employees of a company’s trade secrets225 and 
intellectual property.  Such clauses restrict the disclosure of proprietary 
property and data that are essential for businesses to succeed today.226  
Trade secrets encourage innovation and dissuade unethical behavior.227  As 
attorneys Damien R. Meyer and Meaghan Kramer recently explained: 
 
Companies invest significant resources creating 
confidential and proprietary information and setting 
themselves apart from their competitors.  This 
information is valuable not only to its holder, but also to 
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its competitors.  The challenge to keep secret a 
company’s most valuable information has never been 
greater.  Temptation for employees and others to 
misappropriate and misuse valuable data looms in most 
industries.228 
 
Such duties of confidentiality in these cases guard against the theft of 
property – intellectual property – by individuals who seek to exploit it for 
his or her own financial good, not a larger public interest.  In brief, the 
benefits of restricting speech are exceedingly high in the trade secret 
realm,229 while the burden is not undue.  As the Supreme Court recognized 
more than four decades ago, “[t]he maintenance of standards of commercial 
ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies 
behind trade secret law.”230  The Court also remarked at that time on “the 
importance of trade secret protection to the subsidization of research and 
development and to increased economic efficiency within large companies 
through the dispersion of responsibilities for creative developments.”231  In 
summary, a confidentiality or non-disclosure clause restricting employee 
speech in the trade secrets and intellectual property spaces would not 
trigger First Amendment protection. 
Confidentiality agreements safeguard trade secrets and intellectual 
property, with the intent of encouraging innovation and thwarting theft.232  
In contrast, consumer-review gag clauses are designed to stop 
dissemination of both truthful facts and honest opinions that could affect 
other consumers’ choices regarding fiscal expenditures and, in turn, 
influence a company’s reputation and financial bottom line.  Efficient 
economic markets – those dependent on the free flow of such information 
to weed out poorly performing products, services and businesses – are thus 
unduly burdened by gag clauses.  Neither innovation nor ethical behavior is 
fostered by gag clauses, counter to contractual provisions restricting 
dissemination of trade secrets and intellectual property.233 
In summary, both state laws and the federal Consumer Review Fairness 
Act of 2016 are significant, positive steps forward in allowing information 
																																																						
228 Damien R. Meyer & Meaghan Kramer, Trade Secret Protections Clarified: The 
Growing Struggle Over Workplace Confidences, 51 ARIZ. ATT’Y, Apr. 2015, at 12. 
229 Professor Kurt Saunders explains that “the very survival of a business may depend on 
its ability to maintain the secrecy of its proprietary information.  One study estimated a 
typical business may derive seventy percent or more of its value from its intellectual 
property.  Theft and improper disclosure of trade secrets can be costly.”  Kurt M. Saunders, 
The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 209, 210-11 
(2006). 
230 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
231 Id. at 482. 
232 Supra notes 225-230 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra notes 225-230 and accompanying text (addressing trade secrets and 
intellectual property concerns). 
 
 
234 Widener Law Review [Vol. 24:203 
 
– both factual and opinionated – to flow more freely from consumers to 
potential consumers in the face of business-imposed gag clauses.  The next 
step, however, is to move beyond short-term legislative fixes to the realm of 
constitutional law and, in particular, to the First Amendment.  Non-
disparagement clauses illustrate the importance of the Supreme Court 
fashioning a layer of First Amendment protection surrounding contracts 
that affect free expression.  The undue burden standard may, this article 
suggests, provide one viable approach for such contractual 
constitutionalization.    
 
